### 1NC

#### The aff may only defend the consequences of the hypothetical enactment of the plan by the United States Federal Government.

#### Resolved before a colon indicates a legislative forum

Army Officer School ’4 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by the government

Ericson ’3 Jon M. Ericson, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, 2003, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Switch-side debate breaks down dogma and fosters civic engagement that motivates and expands political activism – the topic is a key starting point for broader victories against securitizing domination

English et al. ’7 Eric English, Stephen Llano, Gordon R. Mitchell, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief & Carly Woods, “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2007, pp. 221-225

It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions. 12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic. 13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’ 14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent - the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

#### Role playing is essential to teaching responsible political practice

Esberg and Sagan ’12 Jane Esberg, special assistant to the director at NYU’s Center on International Cooperation, and Scott Sagan, professor of political science and director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 19, issue 1, 2012, pp. 95-108, taylor & francis

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

### Cap

#### Standpoint epistemology embraces the liberal ideal of contractual agreements between the state and the individual for individual freedom. This naturalizes capitalist oppression.

Katz 2k Adam Katz, English Instructor at Onodaga Community College. 2000. Postmodernism and the Politics of “Culture.” Pg. 74-75.

So, standpoint theory and the politics it advances simply reproduce and update the very liberal categories they wish to critique. Such understand­ings proceed in the same way as liberalism: They construct a model sub­ject based upon a fetishized abstraction from relations between individu­als (such as those produced by gender psychology) and then transform this abstraction into a regulatory principle for evaluating social relations. This fetishized abstraction, just like the abstraction classical liberal theory makes from the exchange of commodities between individual producers, corresponds to outmoded private relations (the domestic servitude of women) that have been made visible as oppressive and unnecessary as new social relations have become possible. The liberal ideal of contractual agreements between equal and free individuals provides capitalist society with a way of managing contradictions and crises by making them appear remediable without fundamental transformation: That is, capitalism sim­ply needs to be freed from distortions and returned to its own standards of fairness and equality. In the same way, the ideals posited by standpoint theory provide new cultural and ideological resources for capitalist society to claim that social problems can be solved by local feminist reorganizations without address­ing the foundations of private property. Whether or not Hartsock or other standpoint theorists intend such a conclusion is beside the point; it is an unavoidable consequence following the assumption that one’s preferred set of values (and the agents who bear them) are internal to the present order. This assumption itself is necessary if one presupposes an essential continuity between experience and practice. Such a utopian understand­ing excludes a theory of conflict that sees social change as the result of confrontations between collective material forces representing opposed interests and produced by global social structures and contradictions; in this case, the realization of the values represented by one of the opposing agencies would include their radical transformation (as a result of the transformations in the social structure), not their implementation or privi­leging in an unchanged form. According to the assumptions of standpoint theory, the values in question can be realized in a piecemeal, peaceful, and cumulative manner—in which case, material confrontations between collective agencies should be avoided and, if necessary, suppressed.

#### Queer theory reflects a postmodern idealism that academics eat up precisely due to its confirmation of capitalism—‘fluid identity’ is a new mask for liberal individualism which obscures relations of production

Case ’94 Sue-Ellen Case, Professor and Chair of Critical Studies in the Theater Department of UCLA, “The Domain-Matrix”, 1994, p. 36-38

Looking back to the 1970s, one is reminded that the notion and the practice of the collective produced one of the signature structures of lesbian feminism, as of the Marxist tradition. Both traditions posited a challenge to capitalist structures through notions of collective ownership and its social practice. Lesbian feminism presumed that capitalism was a patriarchal form of economic practice, deployed against women. Therefore, lesbian feminist events and businesses were organized collectively in order to avoid replicating patriarchal structures in commerce among women. The majority of the collectives had closed down by the late 1980s. If the East bloc fell to a successful take-over by global capitalism, lesbian food collectives, bookstore collectives, living collectives, and theater collectives fell to traditional capitalist practices. The subject was multiple—not in its singular oscillation among multiple positions, but in its very composition across different individuals. The identity "lesbian feminist" was one that groups sought to produce. As socialism waned, postmodern individualism gained ground. Sexual practice was thus extracted from its association with other social and economic practices. By the 1990s, "postmodern lesbian" or queer articles trace the way in which capitalist projects have appropriated such abandoned territories for their own uses. For example, Sasha Torres's sense of the "prime time les-bian," and Danae Clark's "Commodity Lesbianism" describe how the media and market make use of the "sign" lesbians to sell their products. While I would contend that this commodification of what were once collective practices and market uses of the term "lesbian" is the result of the queer retreat, some of the postmodern protectors would, as Robyn Wiegman has done, fault identity politics for it, arguing that "it is along the modernist axis of self-assertion and visibility that both a lesbian consumer market and a marketed commodity repeatedly named lesbian has been achieved'' (10). Yet, in the face of such high capitalist aggressivity, these authors can offer only celebrations of commodification or, as noted in the section "Queer Performativity," isolated strategies of subversion. In particular, "subversive shopping" has been formulated as an apt action within the commodified realm. It is difficult to perceive, finally, what is subversive in buying the version of the sign "lesbian" that ad campaigns have developed. (For a fuller description of the structures of commodification of "lesbian," see "Slipping into Subculture" and "`Subversive' Shopping" in "Bringing Home the Meat.") Thus, the critique of the commodified lesbian, severed from any program for change—in isolation—actually promotes commodification. The evacuation of the outside referent has effectively coupled the body and the materialist critique only to give them over to, as Reinelt has pointed out, the hegemonic practices that endure in the codes. The new "queer dyke" thus appears as commodity fetishist—the dildoed dyke who makes of herself an ad as politics. What remains is mapping the exact route of the retreat through deconstructive critiques. Meanwhile, the collusion with global capitalist uses of such strategies, as noted by Hennessy above, or of national agendas, still remains untested. As the critique withdraws from notions of communities or subcultures into the sign "lesbian" slipping among market strategies, it often becomes what it seeks to critique. From the beginning arguments around "performativity" and "queer" on through the matrix, we can begin to perceive a critical axis forming along the abandonment of the term "lesbian" for "queer," in its class operations, and in its imperialist uses, along with the evacuation of the body, as a subject-suspect. Within the poststructuralist critique of those two terms, textualization and inscription are deployed to cleanse "lesbian" and "body" of their material(ist) accretions. "Queer performativity" thus runs the "race into theory" away from the site of material interventions. Sagri Dhairyam, in "Racing the Lesbian, Dodging White Critics," states the case succinctly: The rubric of queer theory, which couples sexuality and theory and collapses lesbian and gay sexualities, tends to effect a slippage of body into mind: the monstrously feminized body's sensual evocations of smell, fluid, and hidden vaginal spaces with which the name resonates are cleansed, desexualized into a "queerness" where the body yields to intellect, and a spectrum of sexualities again denies the lesbian center stage. (30) The challenge of the "live" body needs to be cleaned up by the abstracting efficiency of theory. But how do all of these theories happen to conjoin with the rise of global capitalism, the new techno-era, and the coming supremacy of the computer screen?

#### Capitalism causes a litany of unspeakably destructive impacts

Parr ’13 Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital, 2013, p. 145-147

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is. It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on Decembe . r i6, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism:'s The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.6 Adaptability, modifications, and displacement, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. Under capitalism, one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven. For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure-myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage- outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength, stamina, and courage with the people around you. All the rest is false hope. In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

#### Vote negative to endorse radical class politics.

#### Increasing contradictions of capital necessitate a new approach. Focus on material production is key to social praxis.

Tumino ’12 Stephen Tumino, more marxist than Marx himself, “Is Occupy Wall Street Communist,” Red Critique 14, Winter/Spring 2012, http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/isoccupywallstreetcommunist.htm

Leaving aside that the purpose of Wolff's speech was to popularize a messianic vision of a more just society based on workplace democracy, he is right about one thing: Marx's original contribution to the idea of communism is that it is an historical and material movement produced by the failure of capitalism not a moral crusade to reform it. Today we are confronted with the fact that capitalism has failed in exactly the way that Marx explained was inevitable.[4] It has "simplified the class antagonism" (The Communist Manifesto); by concentrating wealth and centralizing power in the hands of a few it has succeeded in dispossessing the masses of people of everything except their labor power. As a result it has revealed that the ruling class "is unfit to rule," as The Communist Manifesto concludes, "because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him." And the slaves are thus compelled to fight back. Capitalism makes communism necessary because it has brought into being an international working class whose common conditions of life give them not only the need but also the economic power to establish a society in which the rule is "from each according to their ability, to each according to their need" (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme). Until and unless we confront the fact that capitalism has once again brought the world to the point of taking sides for or against the system as a whole, communism will continue to be just a bogey-man or a nursery-tale to frighten and soothe the conscience of the owners rather than what it is—the materialist theory that is an absolute requirement for our emancipation from exploitation and a new society freed from necessity! As Lenin said, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement" (What Is To Be Done?). We are confronted with an historic crisis of global proportions that demands of us that we take Marxism seriously as something that needs to be studied to find solutions to the problems of today. Perhaps then we can even begin to understand communism in the way that The Communist Manifesto presents it as "the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority" to end inequality forever.

### Welsh – 1NC

#### Scholarship cannot be purely political – their strategy attempts to subvert the fundamental antagonism separating academics from the political sphere, spurring expertism and narcissistic research because it emerges in a competitive context. The opposing poles of social change and personal benefit are irreconcilable – their goal of repairing the community is academic fantasy structured by the impossibility of breaking free from subjective norms.

Welsh ’12 Scott Welsh, Department of Communication @ Appalachian State University, “Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency,” Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 45, no. 1, 2012 jss

Between Scholarly Reflection and Political Agency It is important to keep in mind that, for Žižek, antagonism does not mean simple binary opposition. Instead, to propose the existence of an antagonism is to operate on the assumption of the impossibility of inventing a terminology able to contain, without remainder, the competing elements that make up the whole of a particular realm of human experience (in this case, academia) (2005, 249–54). For example, this article assumes that to be a scholar is to be both embedded within the chains of material consequences that constitute the political and detached from the fully engaged political pursuit of any particular consequences (regardless of whether or not one is fully engaged in the rest of one’s life). A scholarly subject position can be seen as unavoidably a part of and necessarily apart from the political. To suggest that this constitutes an irresolvable antagonism means that the two elements can neither remain separate nor be united. Rather, it is the conflicted relationship itself that constitutes the position of the scholar. Symptoms, according to Žižek, are the function of the ideological inadequacy of either an imagined total separation or an imagined complete unity. Both are means of effacing an antagonism and inviting ideology-frustrating symptoms (2005, 251). Effacing the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency, in both ways, is relatively simple. Consider, first, effacement through projected incommensurability or total separation. Perhaps the most common way this is done is through imagining an objective, politically disinterested position from which a scholar-as-scientist conducts research and reports results. Scholars as scientists “rise above it all” and are not affected by, concerned with, or implicated in the political. They are concerned only with the pursuit of truth or the life of the mind. Rhetoric scholars have been right to draw attention to the impossibility of achieving such political detachment ([Wander 1983](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b33); [Campbell 1983](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b6), 1972; [Ivie 1994](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b19)). For example, recasting and elucidating earlier arguments, James F. Klump and Thomas A. Hollihan elaborate a critique of the idea that scholarly reflection and political action ever remain separate. Their argument is against those who advance a “self-image for [rhetorical] critics” that values “‘objectivity’ as moral non-involvement,” for the very act of choosing to “objectively” investigate the causes of one phenomenon instead of another is to devote [End Page 6] time and resources to one set of priorities instead of another (1989, 92). Every scholarly agenda subsidizes a political agenda, whether intentionally or not ([Young, Battaglia, and Cloud 2010](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b35), 432). Or, as Burke argues, the ideal of scientific detachment is impossible for scholars “except in so far as they can contrive to conceal from themselves the true implications of their role” (1969, 35). Klump and Hollihan also show how complete separation between scholarly reflection and political agency is attempted through aesthetic conceits as well. They explain that “so strong was the social scientific image [during the 1950s and 1960s] that the response to it became an artistic self-image—the critic’s task was to increase appreciation for the artistic use of language in the rhetorical act.” They show how a subjective hermeneutic of appreciation does not escape the idea of complete scholarly detachment associated with supposedly objective knowledge-producing science. Klump and Hollihan astutely note how “both of these self-images alienate” (92). They alienate scholars from the consequences of their scholarly work. Both the scientist and the aesthete refuse the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency by insisting that the political is alien to each of them. Construed as wholly distinct symbolic spheres, the reflective and the political never have reason to come into contact with each other. While Klump and Hollihan convincingly expose the effacement of the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency in both scientific and artistic scholarly identities, they do not recognize, however, that they also efface the antagonism. They simply take the alternate route—refusal by way of declaring an essential oneness between the two. Beyond recognizing the fact that all choices have material consequences, whether intended or not, and arguing that scholars must take them into account, they go a step further and reduce scholarly reflection to a mode of political agency. The reduction proceeds as follows: first, scholars make choices. Second, whether or not they make them intentionally or unintentionally, they will make them nonetheless. Third, those choices will have material consequences (1989, 90–91). Therefore, because our choices, or the words we produce, will have material, political, consequences whether or not we intend them to, we should embrace the consequences we prefer and pursue them directly (the hidden premise being that intentionally pursued consequences are better than unintended ones). Hence, Klump and Hollihan conclude by saying that “the critic that emerges—the interpreter, the teacher, the social actor—is a moral participant, cognizant of the power and responsibility that accompanies full critical participation in his/her society” (1989, 94). [End Page 7] Michael Calvin McGee reduces scholarly reflection to political agency in the same way. At key points, McGee, as well as Klump and Hollihan, refer to Burke’s observation that “all living things are critics,” constantly interpreting the signs around them ([Burke 1984b](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html#b4), 5; [McGee 1990](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b23), 281; [Klumpp and Hollihan 1989](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html#b21), 93). And because the signs around us do, in fact, produce much of the social world in which we live, all speech, including academic writing, is inherently political and should be embraced as such. Hence, McGee challenges scholars to engage in “social surgery,” wherein they substitute “new cultural imperatives” for “old taken-for-granted conventions” in order to “make the world conform to their will.” Moreover, as naturalborn critics, like all living things, scholars cannot help but engage in “social surgery” (1990, 281–82). As with Klump and Hollihan, the only remaining question is whether or not they will acknowledge and embrace their true nature. This argument is repeated throughout the “critical rhetoric” literature of the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, Raymie McKerrow challenges so-called critical rhetoricians to acknowledge their complicity in the production of political culture and take a side. McKerrow advances a liberation theology ethos oriented toward the “the critique of domination” and the emancipation of the oppressed (1989, 93, 103, 106). Although ostensibly responding to McKerrow, Kent Ono and John Sloop largely expand on the ethos implicit or already present in McKerrow’s presentation of critical rhetoric. What they add is the claim that a generalized resistance to ruling-class interests is insufficient to maintain a meaningful, long-term political agenda. What is required is deep investment in a particular cause “able to re-form the individual” (1992, 51). And, just like the other authors, they argue that because even the skeptical critic “often unconsciously commits to a telos despite her attempts to resist the ever-present threat of dogmatism,” critics fully embracing the moral imperative should deliberately, “at the moment of placing pen to paper . . .[,] relinquish skepticism and advance their argument for that moment as if the direction chosen by the critic (i.e. telos) were Truth with a capital ‘T’”(53). This Truth with a capital “T” is not an epistemic conclusion but an unreserved commitment to “the ideal picture we have created for ourselves” of a “utopian future” (1992, 56, 59). Recent contributions across a variety of published forums concerning rhetorical criticism, public intellectualism, and academic engagement demonstrate that this reduction of scholarly reflection to political agency (through the acknowledgment of the fact of complicity) remains influential among rhetoric scholars. In some quarters, it has been radicalized. In the [End Page 8] recent Western Journal of Communication special issue on rhetorical criticism, Stephen Hartnett argues, for example, that rhetoric scholars need to get to the point where they “are no longer studying objects from which they hope to glean some truths to be offered as tools to others.” Instead, scholars are to “build projects where they are directly implicated in and work alongside disadvantaged communities.” The ideal is “scholars who are activists writing about their activism” (2010, 78). Hartnett folds scholarly reflection into politics. The former only reemerges as a distinct kind of activity after the fact in reflective accounts of one’s political efforts. Hence, the truly committed “social justice scholar” needs to learn how to “speak clearly and look authoritative” while repeating “mass-media-shaped tidbits” within the “corporate-driven cesspool of mass media” (2010, 81–83). Explicitly affirming the thrust of Hartnett’s essay, Peter Simonson calls on scholars to “transport their bodies outside the cloisters” and into the political field. Similarly, he responds to Celeste Condit’s concern that McGee made “the rhetorical scholar indistinguishable from the street rhetorician” with “I would answer that passing for a street rhetorician might in fact be the ideal” (2010, 121, 95). Likewise, in the recent Quarterly Journal of Speech forum on engaged scholarship, Anna Young, Adria Battaglia, and Dana Cloud plainly state that because Aristotle was right that “man is by nature a political animal” we must “reframe politics as our job description” (2010, 433). In the Philosophy and Rhetoric forum, Steve Fuller characterizes the “public intellectual” as an “agent of justice.” He deems John Dewey a failed public intellectual because he “refused to use all the available means of persuasion” (2006, 150). His criticism of Dewey, however, is not that Dewey tried and failed to be a public intellectual. Rather, it is Dewey’s alleged refusal itself to be a public intellectual that draws Fuller’s criticism. This is because Fuller’s vision of public intellectualism—a willingness and ability to use all available means of persuasion as an agent of justice—is held up not as an option for some academics in their life outside of the academy but as the essential academic identity. At its best, the academy is “the custodian of the nation’s spirit, the loyal opposition” of whoever holds “the reins of state power at the moment” or the place from which a protected scholarly class is enabled to “speak truth to power.” Using the same logic employed by early critical rhetoricians, anything less is rejected as a cowardly attempt to find an academic identity that “basically absolves intellectuals of any responsibility for their ideas” (2006, 151, 49). Similarly, Henry Giroux concludes his argument about the “responsibility of intellectuals” with the declaration that “if we do not want to repeat the present as the future, or [End Page 9] even worse, become complicit in the dominant exercise of power, it is time for educators to mobilize collectively their energies by breaking down the illusion of unanimity that dominant power propagates while working diligently, tirelessly, and collectively to reclaim the promises of a truly global, democratic future” (2004, 77).

#### Attempting to bridge the gap between scholar and citizen requires an impossible submersion of academia into politics – this failure is sutured by a narcissistic fantasy that projects every error onto a scapegoated other and redirects emancipatory energy into self-defeating ends.

Welsh ’12 Scott Welsh, Department of Communication @ Appalachian State University, “Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency,” Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 45, no. 1, 2012 jss

Giroux’s concluding words, in which scholars reclaim the promises of a truly global democratic future, echo Ono and Sloop’s construction of scholarship as the politically embedded pursuit of utopia, McKerrow’s academic emancipation of the oppressed, McGee’s social surgery, Hartnett’s social justice scholar, and Fuller’s agent of justice. Each aims to unify the competing elements within the scholarly subject position—scholarly reflection and political agency—by reducing the former to the latter. Žižek’s advice is to consider how such attempts are always doomed to frustration, not because ideals are hard to live up to but because of the impossibility of resolving the antagonism central to the scholarly subject position. The titles “public intellectual” and “critical rhetorician” attest to the fundamental tension. “Public” and “rhetorician” both represent the aspiration to political engagement, while “critical” and “intellectual” set the scholar apart from noncritical, nonintellectual public rhetoric. However, rather than allowing the contingently articulated terms to exist in a state of paradoxical tension, these authors imagine an organic, unavoidable, necessary unity. The scholar is, in one moment, wholly public and wholly intellectual, wholly critical and wholly rhetorical, wholly scholar and wholly citizen—an impossible unity, characteristic of the sublime, in which the antagonism vanishes (2005, 147). Yet, as Žižek predicts, the sublime is the impossible. The frustration-producing gap between the unity of the ideological sublime and conflicted experience quickly begins to put pressure on the ideology. This is born out in the shift from the exhilarated tone accompanying the birth of critical rhetoric (and its liberation of rhetoric scholarship from the incoherent and untenable demands of scientific objectivity) to a dispirited accounting for the difficulty of actually embodying the imagined unity of scholarly reflection and political agency. Simonson, for example, draws attention to the gap, noting how, twenty years later, it is hard to resist the feeling that “the bulk of our academic publishing is utterly inconsequential.” His hope is that a true connection between scholarly reflection and political agency may be possible outside of academia (2010, 95). Fuller approaches this conclusion when he says that the preferred path to filling universities with agents of justice is through “scaling back the qualifications needed for tenure-stream posts from the doctorate to the master’s degree,” a way of [End Page 10]addressing the antagonism that amounts to setting half of it afloat (2006, 154). Hartnett is especially interesting because while he also insists on the existence of the gap, dismissing “many” of his “colleagues” as merely dispensing “politically vacuous truisms” or, worse, as serving as “tools of the state” and “humanities-based journals” as “impenetrably dense” and filled with “jargon-riddled nonsense,” he evinces a considerable impatience with the audiences he must engage as a social justice scholar (2010, 69, 74–75). In addition to reducing those populating the mass media to a cabal of “rotten corporate hucksters,” Hartnett rejects vernacular criticisms of his activism as “ranting and raving by fools,” and chafes at becoming “a target for yahoos of all stripes” (87, 84). In other words, the gap is not only recognized on the academic side of the ledger but appears on the public side as well; the public (in the vernacular sense of the word) does not yield to the desire of the social justice scholar. Or, as Žižek puts it, referencing Lacan, “You never look at me from the place in which I see you” (1991, 126). More telling still, Hartnett’s main examples of social justice scholars are either retired or located outside of academia (2010, 86). As Simonson suggests, and Hartnett implicitly concedes, it may well be that it really is only outside the academy that there can be immediate, material, political consequences. In light of Žižek’s account of antagonism, one should not be surprised, however, by the conclusion that broadly effective activism is only possible outside of academia. The failure to unify scholarship and politics was predestined in the symbolic imagination that rendered them unified. Instead, effectively coming to terms with an antagonism means finding ways to keep the competing elements of the antagonism in view—and not simply as “bad” academic pretensions in conflict with “good” political motives. Rather, the two elements that constitute the scholarly subject position, reflective investigation and the production of unavoidable consequences, must be constantly present, each vying for our attention. And, insofar as the two elements are not kept in tension with each other, the scholarly subject position becomes increasingly unbearable, leading to the production of what Žižek calls supplemental ideological fantasies or ready explanations for the gap. For Fuller, the gap between lived experience and the wished-for embodiment of the scholar as agent of justice is explained not by the basic impossibility of resolving the antagonism within the realm of the symbolic itself but by the treacherous acts of colleagues of low moral character. Deploying a Puritan rhetoric ([Roberts-Miller 1999](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b31)), Fuller blames the selfishness of individual scholars pursuing personal gain and “convenience” [End Page 11] for the failure of activist scholarship to emerge (2006, 150). Other scholars who fail to be agents of justice are “feckless” (2006, 149). Those resistant to such a scholarly identity “simply follow the path of least intellectual resistance,” preferring “easily funded research” because it offers “greater professional recognition” (2006, 110, 111). Hartnett follows Fuller in explaining how “theory wolves” have “learned to play the tenure game for their own benefit.” Current “graduate students and assistant professors” are cynical, self-obsessed, and content to explore “the intricacies of representation, often with psychoanalytic overtones that explicitly focus on the self or psyche rather than the community or the political” (2006, 72–73). Yet, fantasy, according to Žižek, is not simple delusion. In fact, how much scholarly research is unrelated to the exorcism of personal demons? Who among us has not shaded an argument one way or another in order to please a particular audience? Who has not fecklessly decided against even sending a letter to the local newspaper? Rather, a key characteristic of fantasy, in Žižek’s use of Lacan, is that it accounts for a persistent failure in a prevailing ideology without making reference to basic, structuring antagonisms inherent to every use of symbols. In this case, the gap—the existence of academic work that appears not to serve (or in reality does not serve) a sublime vision of an organic unity between scholarship and citizenship—is accounted for by the existence of cynical, crafty scholars of low academic rank who just want to get ahead. This fantastic pathway to the palliation of the identity-jeopardizing symptom suggests that without these cowardly, selfish, yet strangely powerful neophytes, scholarly reflection and political agency would finally consummate their symbolic union. In this new context of frustration, what is now most “real” is the spiritual principle of the oneness of scholarly reflection and political agency, while the experienced fact of failed transcendence is reduced to a mere empirical obstacle (feckless or selfish individuals) to be displaced.

#### Alt: Reject the aff’s attempt to unify academic debate and social justice politics.

#### Trying to eliminate the opposition between these terms constricts the emancipatory potential of debate – instead of denying the competitive nature of the game, we should keep it in view as a reminder of the impossibility of full political subjectivity

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What is Žižek’s psychoanalytic advice? Identify with the symptom (1989, 128). Identification with the symptom means noting how the symptom is quite likely a byproduct of the ideology itself, or a consequence of one’s own symbolic identity, and not a simple empirical fact to be negated. In this case, the antagonism between the symbolic practices of scholarly reflection and political action yields academic products that cannot be reduced to disinterested science or political engagement. To be an academic is to be (unsettlingly) in the political world but not of the political world. It is to resist the belief that one could finally fulfill the drive to transcendence structuring the academic subject position. Žižek’s “coming to terms” with [End Page 12] antagonism means, in Burke’s language, learning to leave the two impulses constituting this dialectical pair in “jangling relation” to each other ([Žižek 1989](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b36), 3, 5, 133; 2005, 242–43; [Burke 1969](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b2), 187) or to fold the existence of the jangling relation into a less anxiety-producing vocabulary going forward. To identify with the symptom is to begin the process of inventing an identity that allows one to accept and even enjoy the tension as the constitutive feature of the identity ([Michael 2000](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b25), 12). Nevertheless, the desire to “make a difference” needs to remain in full force. However, when an individual scholar wants to make a difference as the thing in and of itself versus making a distinctly scholarly difference, the antagonism is again repressed. In seeking to make a difference as the thing in itself, scholars, in Žižek’s language, “overtake” their “desire” and become an object of disgust (1991, 110). In fact, Hartnett, McKerrow, Condit, and Giroux are each sensitive to this. Hartnett puts it most explicitly when he warns that the “haggard activist, angry and inflamed, accusing others of their transgressions while embodying anxiety, achieves little, alienates many, and often succumbs to despair” ([Hartnett 2010](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html#b18), 70–71; [Condit 1990](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b8), 345; [Giroux 2004](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b14), 73). In his eighth and final principle of critical rhetoric (“criticism is performance”), McKerrow qualifies his call to political engagement by distancing himself from Phillip Wander, whom he characterizes as wanting scholars to “take to the streets as practicing revolutionaries.” In other words, after seventeen pages of calling for scholars to perform critical rhetoric in order to liberate the oppressed from institutional and cultural domination, McKerrow devotes three blushing sentences to hedging his bet, explaining that he really just means that scholars should be “specific intellectuals” working within the confines of the university (1989, 108). All of these scholars are correct to fear that the image of activist academics engaging in practices indistinguishable from politics, especially in state-supported institutions, is a potentially grotesque image, even if the popular image is rarely accurate ([Ivie 2005](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b20), 62–68). Hartnett in particular is not unaware of the significance of public perception. He claims, however, that the public sees decreasing value in universities because they are populated by “inane” and “depraved” scholars (theory wolves) producing publicly disconnected, jargon-riddled nonsense. While this assessment may account for elements within academia that refuse the antagonism by maintaining a relatively thorough detachment from the communities they claim to serve, reducing scholarship to “activists writing about their activism” is no more responsive to the antagonism and would understandably provoke public suspicion ([Hartnett 2010](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ups.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html" \l "b18), 75, 78). [End Page 13] Moreover, coming to terms with the antagonism is central to academic freedom. In his bracing polemic on politics in the academy, Stanley Fish recognizes the antagonism between academic freedom and the freedom one enjoys as a function of citizenship. Academic freedom, he argues, is the freedom to “academicize” anything freely and without fear of reprisal. For Fish, this means the freedom to treat any subject whatsoever as an open question in need of further study, no matter how politically controversial investigating some particular subject may be (2008, 87). And insofar as every citizen enjoys “freedom of speech,” as Fuller also points out in his reference to Dewey’s founding of the AAUP, academic freedom also includes the right to actually be a citizen advancing a political agenda without fear of losing one’s university employment (2006, 151). However, when the citizenly role of advancing a political agenda overtakes reflective investigation in the practice of the scholarly role, “academic” freedom is not at stake but is, rather, put into jeopardy by the refusal to inhabit the inherently conflicted scholarly subject position that justifies one’s academic immunity from political reprisal in the first place. While “the academic is political” no less than “the personal is political,” that does not mean that it is not useful or necessary to establish a social sphere defined by the intention to resist political embeddedness, even if such a distinction is unavoidably tenuous.

### Case

#### Society is not ‘straight’ or ‘queer’—anti-assimilationism turns queer politics into exclusionary withdrawal from culture, retaining the violent drives for unity and identity which it seeks to escape

McKee ’99 Alan McKee, “’Resistance is Hopeless’: Assimilating Queer Theory,” Social Semiotics, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1999, http://eprints.qut.edu.au/42011/2/42011.pdf

These are some of the elements by which a cultural interaction might be recognised as assimilation. But when the elements of the metaphor are made more explicit, how convincing does it remain? Is it possible to identify a discrete, homogeneous and static culture named ‘mainstream’ and ‘heterosexual’? Is it convincing to argue that this heterosexual culture competely lacks any difference? That it has no place for the individual? That it functions entirely without passion? How believable is a model of cultural interaction which posits a complete transfer of power in one direction, and suggests a dominant culture so static, so powerful and yet so absorbent, that it can completely soak up another without making any changes to itself? The use of science fiction models hopefully suggests the distance between such a conception of culture and that in which we currently live. As Steve Neale has suggested, part of the generic functioning of science fiction is precisely that it is recognised as unbelicveable, that texts functioning in this genre must always be obvious as distanced from contemporary experience (Neale 1990). As with all metaphor, the social commentary of science fiction is based as much on difference from the object described as similarity to it. The assimilated Picard may provide a neat and amusing metaphor with which Queer theorists can berate breeders for their lack of individuality and feelings; but the inhuman and undifferentiated zombie is obviously distant from the experience of most people living in the supposedly ‘assimilating’ mass of ‘mainstream’ culture. The degree to which we can recognise the Borg Picard as science fiction is the degree to which this model of assimilation is unfair to current cultural situations. And more than this, it is unfair to Queer Theories. Other Queers Queer Theory has offered possibilities for rethinking our models of culture, com- munities, identity, and the interaction of these entities. Having traced one strand of writing that comes under the umbrella of Queer, this paper now explores in a relatively unsystematic way, some other possibilities—what seem to me to be more attractive possibilities—which have been equally as well accepted as Queer. They bear little relation to the anti-assimilatory positions already outlined. Queer Theories are ambidictory. This is as close to an axiom as this paper allows itself. After structuralist theory, it should be difficult to imagine a discursive entity like a ‘culture’ being fully present to itself, never mind stable enough to destroy another such entity. Cultures are always already simulacra, a series of discursive presences lacking in an essential and stable core. From such a perspective, the idea that such entities have an ideal essence which could absorb another while remaining unaltered is an odd one. Cultures are interpretive, abstract and virtual creations. Meaning itself is never stable: much less so cultures. More than this, a model of static and opposed power blocs fits poorly with much of the way in which ‘Queer’ has been mobilised as a theoretical term. Indeed, within some writing which takes a ‘Queer’ status (for example, Dunne 1995), a self- contradictory position emerges: anti-assimilationist rhetoric allows a profound form of identity politics to be taken up: an anti—identity identity politics. ‘They’ have been assimilated; ‘we’ remain radically transgressive and fluid. As a move away from rigid identity politics, Queer also offers the promise of cultures which are precisely not conceptualised in this way. It is a post-structuralist term, an identifier of sexuality which moves beyond stable and essential cores. Following on from this position, a Queer reading of culture quite distinct from that of anti-assimilationist Queer Theories can be found in the work of Alexander Doty, for example: thc Queer often operates within the nonQueer, as the nonQueer does within the Queer within cultural production and reception, Queer erotics are already part of culture’s erotic centre (Doty 1995: 73) This position strikes me as slightly odd, simply for its use of the term ‘nonQueer’ (whatever its ironic status). This version of Queer does not rely on concepts of identity in order to understand the individual and the culture in which she operates. Yet the use of Queer and nonQueer still points to identity politics of the most binaristic kind. Nevertheless, Doty points towards another rccognisably Queer project: that of retheorising culture: proposing other models of, rather than simply centres and margins. Elspeth Probyn, for example, suggests the concept of ‘the outside`: the outside is a more adequate figure for thinking about social relations and the social than either an interior/exterior or a center/marginal model. (Probyn 1996: ll) While anti—assimilatory models of culture, in their fear of being taken over by unattractive mainstream cultures, prescribe only a very limited number of ways of living as suitable for lesbians and gay men, ‘Queer’ models allow an attractive rewriting of the power relations involved in the interaction of cultures more gener- ally. Such a reconceptualisation of culture is one of the dangers—and joys—of Queer: the theory has allowed a rereading of what counts as a centre. As Doty suggests, the Queer may already be at, and always have been at, the centre of the dominant culture which anti—assimilationist Queer finds to be homogeneous and bland. David Halperin approaches this possibility with a slight sense of hesitation, but a cheekiness that points to its joyful possibilities: Queer demarcates not a positivity, but a positionality vis—a—vis the normative—a positionality that is not restricted to lesbians and gay men, but is in fact available to anyone who is or who feels marginalised because of his or her sexual practices: it could include some married couples without children, for example, or even (who knows?) some married couples with children—with, perhaps, very naughty children. (Halperin 1995: 62) Grasping such a possibility, Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli finds, in that terrible space named ‘the suburbs’, accounts of sexuality which bear little relation to the suppos- edly normative sexual spaces anti-assimilationist writing that supposedly inhabits the dominant (central) terrain (Pallotta-Chiarolli 1996). In the Australian context, this argument is played out in particularly visible terms. In an article entitled ‘The Sum of Us', Gabrielle Carey addresses the mainstream audience of a major newspaper; and suggests that the Sydney Lesbian and Gay Mardi Gras is, in fact, a central part of what it now means to be Australian: besides Anzac Day our only other popularly supported, well—attended celebration is the Sydney Lesbian and Gay Mardi Gras. It could be argued that the Mardi Gras is Australia’s most genuinely grassroots ritual eel- ebration. Although the Mardi Gras as such is modelled on a foreign idea, the inspiration for the festival came from the people on the ground. It is something that has grown out of the community (Carey 1995: 32) The Lesbian and Gay Mardi Gras in Sydney, Australia, is a massive festival celebrating bodies and sexuality, non-monogamy, spectacle, pleasure, desire, drug- enhanced sexual practices, community and support. It is now understood to be a central part of precisely that mainstream, bland assimilating community against which some Queer is so set. In order to make this argument, anti-assimilationist Queer must make clear that the Mardi Gras is in fact part of the monogamous, unpassionate, suburban ideal it so hates: ...there were some who suspected that Sydney had begun to neutralise the parade’s marginality and to tame its disrespect; that the parade’s subver- sions and perversions, its naughty imitations of the heterosexual matrix, could now be billed as safe tourist fare. (Harris 1995: 20) But as a prime example of assimilation, the Mardi Gras also makes clear the difficulties of the metaphor. ‘Mainstream' culture is not unaffected by the supposed absorption. As Australia continually partakes in the discursive reformulation of its own identity, the Mardi Gras becomes central to the mainstream notion of itself. Australianness becomes Queer. Certainly, ‘marginality’ is lost: but it is, perhaps, the notion of marginality that is lost rather than simply ‘our’ experience of it. Taking up Doty’s terminology, Queer is already at the centre of the non—Queer, the non—Queer of the Queer: the binaries collapse when them is already us——and vice versa: In a traditional philosophical opposition we have not a peaceful coexistence of facing terms, but a violent hierarchy. One of the terms dominates the other… To deconstruct the opposition is above all, at a particular mo- ment, to reverse the hierarchy. (Derrida 1983: 85). As Jagose writes the history of Queer, Eve Kosoksky Sedgewick initiated the public circulation of Queer Theory with the suggestion that ‘hetcrosexuality is derivative of homosexuality’ (jagose 1996: 16). Similarly, it is simple enough now to argue that the ‘straight’ is merely a subset of the Queer. If such a Queer reformulation is accepted, then it becomes the case that those who have traditionally been written as the majority, the stable, nuclear, carefully hierarchical family, are in fact simply a subset of Queer practices; the slightly less Queer version of social experience in the Westem twentieth century. Straightness is revealed to be a subset of a more generalised Queer relationship to culture: a particular way of being marginalised. The nonQueer is already part of the Queer, the Queer part of the nonQueer. Similarly, the relations of assimilation and resistance might be rewritten in terms of supplementarity: that the terms are not set in a non-negotiable relation of opposites. The models can be redeployed so that resistance is understood to be a subset of assimilation. If assimilation and resistance both signal the interaction of cultures, then all culture involves ‘assimilation’, the acceptance and translation of the forms of communication of another culture: while all interaction similarly involves resistance, the speaking against, the lack of exact fit which results in any meeting of the non—identical.

#### Edelmen’s fetish for rigid, unchanging notions of the symbolic tautologically erases the differences between fascism and progressive democracy. The underside of “no future” is a homogenization of history from the privileged eye of the present.

Cohen ‘7 Jeffrey Cohen, Professor of English at George Washington University, “No Future: Terminus,” In the Middle, 4/13/2007, http://www.inthemedievalmiddle.com/2007/04/no-future-terminus.html

No Future concludes with its strongest chapter, on Alfred Hitchcock's The Birds, the inhuman, and the queer. Aside from the author's decision to employ as many avian puns and clichés as possible in order to stress the bird in the human (after a few pages, the yuks about birds of a feather and cocks of the walk peck the feathered nest of the prose into corn), the chapter's strength is its focus upon the insufficiency of the category "human" to contain the vastness it is asked to tame. "Rather than expanding the reach of the human, as in Butler's claim for Antigone" Edelman writes, "we might ... insist on enlarging the inhuman instead" (152). The chapter yields a quote that for me brings back the reasons the first chapter seemed so inadequate to its own grave pronouncements, namely: "the fascism of the baby's face" ... subjects us to its sovereign authority as the figure of politics itself (of politics, that is, in its radical form as reproductive futurism), whatever the face a particular politics gives that baby to wear -- Aryan or multicultural, that of the thirty-thousand year Reich or of an ever-expanding horizon of democratic inclusivity. Which is not to say that the difference of those political programs makes no difference, but rather that both, as political programs, are programmed to reify difference and thus to secure, in the form of the future, the order of the same. (151) Ralph Nader made a related argument in 2000 about Republocrats: it doesn't matter which side you choose, it's all the same political system, whichever party you elect perpetuates the present state. I don't think I'm risking very much to say that in a democracy (even a democracy within a republic) it is riskier to believe that every choice is the same choice and opt out (even if it is the mild form of opting out that voting for Nader represented) than it is to trust in the possibility of an unpredetermined, non-replicative future. Is it controversial to say that George Bush as president has brought about a profoundly different world from the one that Al Gore would have fostered? Is it controversial to say that fascist regimes like Nazi Germany and democratic ones like contemporary Great Britain might use love of the child in propagandistic ways, but that they are not self-replicating regimes of the same order, and possibly not to be mashed into a single shared Symbolic? And that's what I found most tiresome about this book: not the fact that the future gets suspended, but that the whole of the past and the present, everywhere and everytime, are rendered the same thing. A Hitchcock film from 1963 gives us a glimpse of the same Symbolic Order as homophobic remarks made a far Left mayor of Lourdes, France, in 2000 (a mayor who made the international news not so much for those remarks, but because he was ousted from his party for having made them, a fact Edelman does not mention). The Symbolic is monolithic and homogeneous and immune to history. Its existence is approached, like that of the Real and the Imaginary, with a religious awe. All three work as they do apparently for the reason that Jacques Lacan, their prophet, stated that they work thus -- a kind of Deism without an actual God.